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PANEL I: THE NATURE AND
EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
PRINCIPAL PAPERS
GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE WORK OF
FISCAL TERMITES
Vito Tanzi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Deepening globalization and associated or parallel technological and institutional developments are creating conditions
which may reduce the industrial countries' ability to sustain
high levels of taxation. This paper identifies and discusses
eight trends which may generate revenue falls. It also discusses some measures that might neutralize or reduce the impact
of these trends. Some recent literature has pointed to the fragility of the countries' and especially of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries' tax
systems in the face of deepening globalization and associated
technological and institutional developments.' A potentially
significant and negative impact of globalization on the economies of countries is likely to come through the tax systems. So
far, there is little quantitative evidence indicating that the tax
systems of the industrial countries are collapsing. On the con* Paper presented at the Symposium, "International Tax Policy in the New
Millennium," at Brooklyn Law School, November 9-10, 2000. Assistance received
from Thomas Baunsgaard is much appreciated. I also would like to thank Messrs.
Krister Andersson, John Crotty, Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Emil Sunley, and
Howell Zee for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD (Brookings
Instit. 1995) [hereinafter TANZI 19951. See also Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax Systems, in STEUERSYSTEME DER ZUKUNFr 11-27
(Gerold Krause-Junk ed., 1996) [hereinafter Tanzi 1996].
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trary, for many of these countries the level of taxation is at, or

near, a historical high. However, in most countries in the
1990s, the tax level stopped growing and, in several, it actually
declined. This behavior contrasts sharply with that of previous
decades. Furthermore, some finance ministers have been complaining about the effect of tax competition on the revenue of
their countries, and the OECD and the European Union have
been concerned about various aspects of tax competition. Thus,
quantitative evidence on the impact of globalization on tax
revenue is still limited, but that evidence may not tell much
about the future. This paper proposes the thesis that, as time
passes, the impact of globalization on tax revenue is likely to
accelerate and become obvious in the revenue statistics of the
countries.
Globalization, and the associated increased integration
across borders, facilitated by rapid technological progress, is
likely to affect the countries' capacity to collect taxes. It also
will affect the distribution of the tax burden. The reasons for
this assertion will be discussed in Section II of this paper.
Section III will mention some possibilities for neutralizing the
impact of globalization on tax revenue. Section IV will draw
some conclusions.
A cursory glance at tax revenue trends in OECD countries
over the last three decades reveals a substantial increase in
the total tax burden, but also some changes in the composition
of tax revenue. Table 1 shows that the average tax burden for
OECD countries rose from 26 percent in 1965, to 35 percent in
1985, and to 37 percent in 1997. It also shows that the
growth in the tax burden has slowed over the years.4
The composition of tax revenue also has changed. The
initial increase in the share of the personal income tax from
1965 to 1985 was reversed in the 1990s, and is now close to
the level seen in the 1970s. The share of the corporate income
tax has remained relatively stable during this period, while
social security contributions have increased substantially.

2. For 11 out of 29 OECD countries, for which OECD has reported historical
data, the level of taxation in 1997 was at a record high. For most of the other
countries it was close to the record.
3. See Table 1, at Appendix A.
4. From an increase of 21 percent in 1965-75, and 11 percent in 1975-85, to
6 percent in 1985-95, and to almost zero in the 1990s.
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While the total share of consumption taxes has decreased a
little, from 36 percent in 1965, to 31 percent in 1997, there has
been a distinct shift from specific taxes to general sales taxes
(spearheaded by the growing dominance of value-added taxes
(VAT)). The share of property taxes fell until 1985, but remained constant afterwards.
Specific countries, of course, have had other experiences
primarily reflecting differences in their tax policies. While the
growth in the overall tax burden varies across countries, Ireland stands out as having experienced a sustained reduction in
the tax burden during the 1990s. Other countries that have
experienced a reduction in their tax burdens in the 1990s are:
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden. These
reductions undoubtedly reflect the policies followed by these
countries rather than the general effects of globalization. The
impact of globalization on taxation began to be felt more intensely in the 1990s, when capital markets were liberalized
and economies became more integrated on a global scale.

II. FisCAL TERMITES
The data reported in Table 1 indicate that, for most industrial countries, the fiscal house is still standing and looks solid.
Most of these countries are getting much more revenue today
than they did two or three decades ago. However, on closer
inspection, one can begin to visualize the work of "fiscal termites" busily gnawing at the foundations of the tax systems.
Whether the work of these termites eventually will bring serious damage to the fiscal houses remains to be seen. It is possible that while the impact of globalization will constitute a
challenge to present tax administrations, it may provide opportunities to use new technology and knowledge to raise tax
revenue in innovative ways to continue to be able to finance
the current high levels of public spending. It is conceivable
that, as in the past, new taxes will be invented and used to
extract more revenue from taxpayers.5 However, this possi-

5. For example, the "discovery" of the value added tax in the 1950s, and its
widespread use in later years, must be considered the most important technological development in taxation in the past 50 years. The use of gross assets taxes
and of taxes on financial transactions have been less important technological developments in Latin America.
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bility does not diminish the need to assess the ways in which
current developments are likely to affect the existing tax systems. The rest of this section will describe some of these ways.
Eight fiscal termites will be identified; although there possibly
are others. Not all of these are of equal importance and they
are not necessarily listed in the order of their potential impact.
A. Electronic Commerce and Transactions
The first of the termites is the growing use of electronic
commerce and electronic transactions in general.6 Electronic
commerce (e-commerce) has been growing at very high rates
and is expected to reach high volumes within a few years. A
large share of the world commerce, and especially that among
enterprises (business-to-business), soon could be arranged
through the Internet. Projections for the growth of electronic
commerce, of course, are difficult to make given the substantial
uncertainty involved. However, according to Forrester Research, transactions over the Internet in 1999 added up to over
$150 billion, and it is predicted that by 2003 this figure could
grow to over $3 trillion.' Electronic commerce inevitably will
affect tax revenue. In the United States, sales tax revenue by
some states are being affected by this trend as shown by Table
2. By 2003, some states may.lose as much as 4 percent of their
sales tax revenue. Fox and Bruce have estimated that by 2003
the erosion of the sales tax base for U.S. state and local governments could be almost $11 billion.' Given the expected
growth of electronic commerce, this loss quickly could escalate
into much larger amounts. The international dimensions of the
revenue losses undoubtedly will be much larger.
The prevalent political mood in the U.S. seems to be
against the introduction of taxes on the Internet, at least in
the short term.9 The U.S. Congress has imposed a temporary
moratorium on taxes on Internet transactions. The reason is
6. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Background
and Proposal, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INTERNET: TAXATION AND PRIVACY (Nich-

olas Imparato ed., 1999).
7. E-Commerce: Shopping around the web, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2000, at
64.
8. See Table 2, at Appendix B.
9. Governor Gilmore of the State of Virginia, who headed the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Electronic Commerce, argued that such commerce should be tax
free to allow it to grow without impediments.
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presumably similar to the infant industry argument (upgraded
to the new-age economy), to ensure that the potential of the
Internet get fully realized without the stifling impact of taxation.10 It is argued that imposing taxes on sales through the
Internet would slow down its use. However, so far little work
has been done estimating the impact of Internet transactions
on tax revenue. At least for consumer purchases, one would
expect parallels to mail order purchases where, in the United
States, sales taxes traditionally have been viewed as an important determinant of a decision to purchase goods or services
through mail order. Goods bought from states without sales
taxes have avoided paying taxes.
Another study based on a large sample of e-commerce
transactions in the U.S. found that the tax impact on Internet
purchases is likely to be significant, and very similar to the tax
impact on purchases through mail order catalogues. 1' Similar
issues arise when, for example, American companies sell goods
or services over the Internet to European customers because
the United States does not have a value added tax and the
collection of the tax at the point of destination is difficult.
Union has expressed an intention to
Recently, the European
12
try to tax these sales.
Several changes implied by electronic commerce will challenge seriously the tax authorities. The long run quantitative
importance of these changes is still uncertain but it could be
significant.
The first and most obvious change is a shift from transactions requiring papers, which leave various traces for the tax
authorities to follow, such as invoices, to virtual transactions,
which leave less identifiable traces. In many countries tax
administrations still rely on paper invoices for monitoring sales
taxes. Even though, in theory, computer-based transactions

10. There also may be the view that the Internet, by affecting growth, may
raise other tax revenue. This is a kind of supply-side argument similar to those
popular in the early 1980s.
11. Austan Goolsbee, In a World Without Borders: The Impact of Taxes on
Internet Commerce, 115 Q. J. ECON. 561-576 (2000). See also Table 2, at Appendix

B.
12. The Commission has come out in favor of registration in one member
country, applying the tax rate of that country to all sales (origin principle). Presently, the European Business Community (UNICE) is discussing whether to put
forward to the commission a proposal for a uniform, lower rate for e-commerce.
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could be traced, in practice, this is more difficult. When originbased taxation prevails, sales establishments can locate themselves in places where there are low or no sales taxes. These
places may be states or countries, including so called tax havens. Furthermore, some places may be encouraged to become
low-taxed jurisdictions. But destination-based taxation may be
very difficult to enforce especially with a growing volume of
trade in a world set to facilitate foreign trade. Just think of the
U.S. Customs Service opening every package that enters the
United States. 3
The second change is the increasingly important technological shift from the production and sale of physical to digital
products. In contrast to products traditionally sold in shops
and in a format that gave them some physical content, many
new products are losing or will lose their physical characteristics. As a consequence, the location of the sales outlets will
be more difficult to determine. Music, writing, photos, engineering plans, movies, medical advice, financial advice, educational services, and so on can now be downloaded directly over
the Internet. Furthermore, the downloading can be done from
almost anywhere in the world, including from satellites. Thus,
the definition of a "permanent establishment" for tax purposes
will become very difficult. 4 These "sales" are likely to increase their share in total consumption in the future.
Given the trends described above, the meaning of tax jurisdiction becomes vague. 5 Who should pay the tax and who
should collect the money? And how should this be done? In the
brave new world of the future, products made up of pure

13. An article in the New York Times entitled, Online Sales Spur Illegal Importing of Medicine to U.S., gives a sense of the problem. The article cites the
Commissioner of the Customs Service saying that, "The Internet has given us a
lot more work. We have been deluged with prescription drugs coming in from
overseas. It is a major challenge to deal with this large increase in volume." Robert Pear, Online Sales Spur Illegal Importing of Medicine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2000, at Al.
14. The European Commission particularly has been concerned about the sale
of such "products" from the United States to European countries. Such sales have
not had to pay value added taxes. The challenge for the Commission is to find a
realistic way of imposing these taxes.
15. This is already affecting the art world. For example, a painting is sold by
a Russian to an American through an auction held in a tax-free forum. How is
this transaction to be taxed? See Stephen J. Kobrin, Taxing the Net, in WORLD
LINK (1999). See also Stephen J. Kobrin, There is No There, There: Gertrude Stein
and the Governance of Cyberspace (Mimeo: July 15, 2000) (on file with author).
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knowledge could be sold from anywhere on the planet, or even
from outer space, and the identity of the seller, or for that
matter the buyer, could be difficult to determine. Many goods
will disappear as "products." The full implications of these
changes are still barely understood, but are likely to become
progressively more important in the future."
B. Use of Electronic Money
The second termite is the possibility that, with the passing
of time, real money will begin to be substituted by electronic
money (e-cash) in the normal transactions of individuals. The
money balances of individuals could be embedded in the chips
of electronic cards which could be used to make payments and
settle accounts. This trend surely would increase the difficulties of the tax authorities as well as those of the monetary
authorities.'
Electronic cash can be divided into on-line and off-line ecash." On-line e-cash is likely to be in the form of a softwarebased system where a user would purchase a "purse," software
from a participating bank, in which digital "coins" are stored to
make micro-payments over the Internet. Web sites would be
able to charge miniscule amounts on a pay-as-you-go basis
rather than relying on lumpy subscriptions or not charging at
all. Off-line e-cash could be a card-based system functioning as
a direct alternative to cash, which would be more suitable for
larger transactions. E-cash in both forms can be made available either through accounted or unaccounted systems. In an
accounted system, the e-cash issuer maintains central records
of transactions, maintaining an audit trail of an e-cash user's

16. For example, the full use of the Internet for providing information and for
making contracts and payments may, in time, reduce the need for retailers and
shops for many goods and services.
17. It should be recalled that the use of cash has been one of the factors
stimulating the underground economy and tax evasion. See Vito Tanzi, The Underground Economy in the United States: Estimates and Implications, 135 BANCA
NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. REV., 427 (Dec., 1980). The use of e-cash will be a
further stimulus. See Mervyn" King, Tax Systems in the XXIst Century, in VISIONS
OF THE TAX SYSTEMS OF THE XXIST CENTURY (Kluwer Law International 1997).
See also Mervyn King, Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old (paper presented at Symposium on "New Challenges for Monetary Policy," Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, Aug. 27, 1999) (on file with author).
18. Anne C. Fairpo, Taxation Implications of Electronic Cash, TAX PLANNING
INT'L E-CoMMERcE 11, 11-12 (July 1999).
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receipts and payments. Clearly, this would be preferable for
tax administration purposes, but might be considered too intrusive by users. An unaccounted system, on the contrary, is
one where no such central record of transactions exists. While
this would allow users anonymity, the desire to use this for
large-scale transactions may be subdued by the lack of records
increasing the risk of fraudulent behavior or the difficulty of
resolving disputes. If this latter consideration does not become
too significant, a combination of secret bank accounts with offline e-cash could create a nightmare for tax administrations.
While the technology exists to facilitate the spread of ecash, the actual use is still very limited. 9 In other words, this
termite has not yet started its real work. This is partly due to
the lack of a single standard for smart cards, but also may
reflect a wide gap between the existing technology and present
legislation. Until regulatory issues regarding consumer protection and counterfeiting are clarified, most consumers may
remain skeptical about using e-cash. However, the apparent
recent backing of e-cash by certain major credit card companies
may provide the impetus to move from imagination to widespread use in the future.
The principal risk to the tax system from e-cash arises
from an unaccounted system, since there will be no tax reporting from financial intermediates." This lack of an audit trail
will pose a risk to both VAT and sales tax collections, particularly from sales of electronic goods and services, but also to the
collection of income tax-it may be possible in the future to
receive payments in e-cash for work delivered over the
Internet. This also could affect capital taxation as individuals
and companies will be able to transfer money instantly, and at
little cost, to low-tax jurisdictions. As a result of reduced transaction costs, the threshold at which a tax-saving mechanism
becomes financially worthwhile will be lowered by the commercialization of e-cash."

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. These transactions may use deposits held in banks and countries which
allow secret accounts.
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C. Intra-company'Trade
The third termite is the growing importance of trade that
takes place within multi-nationals, that is among different
parts of multi-nationals situated in different countries. While
not a new issue for tax administrators, this potential problem
has been attracting more attention in recent years in view of
the fast growth in world trade and especially in trade within
multi-national corporations. Intra-firm trade now accounts for
a large and growing share of total world trade. This trade
creates problems for national tax authorities deriving from the
potential use and abuse of "transfer prices" by multi-nationals
on loans, the allocation of fixed costs, and the valuation of
trademarks and patents. Many tax administrators believe that
some of these enterprises manipulate these prices to move
profits from jurisdictions with high tax rates to those with low
tax rates.2 Under present tax arrangements this problem is
likely to continue to grow. The tax authorities of many countries are now worried about this trend, but are often at a loss
as to what to do about it.
While transfer pricing is posing challenges for tax administrators, it is also rapidly changing the way international
business is conducted. A recent survey on transfer pricing
practices by more than 600 multinationals (domiciled in 19
different countries) illuminates the increasing role that transfer pricing plays for international business, and for how multinationals are being taxed.' While the surveyed multi-nationals continue to identify maximization of operating performance,
not optimizing tax arrangements, as the most important factor
shaping their behavior, the surveyed companies saw a clear
connection between the desire to avoid double taxation and the
use of transfer pricing. However, many also felt pressured to
resolve the complex business and transfer pricing matters
arising from globalization, particularly given the growing at

22. Though it also could lead to instances of double taxation if inconsistent
transfer pricing rules are applied by different tax authorities. Several empirical
studies have pointed to the possibility that companies actually manipulate such
prices and some countries, such as Ireland, have been mentioned as potential
beneficiaries of these manipulations.
23. Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing 1999 Global Survey: Practices, Perceptions, and Trends for 2000 and Beyond, 19 TAX NOTES INT'L 1907 (Nov. 15, 1999).
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tention by the revenue authorities of several countries to the
practice.
The survey respondents confirmed that the U.S.-initiated
transfer pricing model (with accompanying documentation
requirements, penalties, and enforcement) is spreading to other nations, with particular focus on the arm's-length standard
enforced by the threat of large penalties for non-compliance.
For many multi-nationals, this has led to a realization of the
desirability of a global approach to designing and documenting
transfer pricing policies. There is also a desire for certainty of
treatment and guaranteed avoidance of double taxation, perhaps resulting in an increased usage of mutual agreement
mechanisms such as advance pricing agreements. However,
such agreements may, at times, convert a corporate tax from a
tax on actual profits to a tax on presumed profits. Such agreements also add substantially to the cost of doing business in
several taxing jurisdictions.
In response to the private sector demand for increased
certainty regarding transfer pricing rulings, a growing number
of tax jurisdictions are beginning to apply advance pricing
arrangements, whereby the criteria for applying the arm'slength principles are determined in advance of the transactions
taking place.2" The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the
United States has been in the forefront in this regard, but tax
administrations in other countries increasingly are making use
of similar methods.
To provide some guidance, the OECD recently issued an
annex to the previously released Transfer Pricing Guidelines
suggesting how to conduct advance pricing arrangements under the so-called mutual agreement procedure.' This allows
competent authorities to undertake the mutual agreement discussions and provides guidance on the content usually required
in advance pricing arrangement proposals and the methodology
applied; reiterating that the guiding principle should be the
application of arm's-length principles.
The rise of e-commerce also implies its own transfer pricing problems.2 6 If multi-nationals become even better at fur24. However, for many inputs created specifically for a final product, there
may not be a market or an arm's-length price.
25. John Neighbour, OECD Issues Guidance on Mutual Agreement APAs, 19
TAx NOTES INT'L 1954 (Nov. 22, 1999).
26. Michel P. Boyle et al., The Emerging International Tax Environment for
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ther decentralizing functions, as telecommunications and information technology develop and transaction costs fall, this could
result in ever more complex transfer price transactions. This is
likely to put more strain on transaction-based transfer pricing
rules and may force a shift towards increased use of profit-split
methods (as has been the more recent experience with global
trading of commodities or financial derivatives).
D. Off-shore FinancialCenters and Tax Havens
The fourth fiscal termite is the growing importance of offshore financial centers (OFCs) and tax havens as conduits for
financial investments." The growth of these OFCs has been
stimulated by the flow of digital information that now allows
money and knowledge to be moved easily and cheaply in real
time, and by the existing regulatory arrangements of specific
countries. Estimates of these deposits exceed US$5 trillion.2 8
It is unlikely that many of those who earn incomes on these
deposits report them to their national tax authorities." The
U.N. report indicates the proliferation of particular legal entities, such as international business corporations and off-shore
trusts, routinely used for money-laundering and for tax evasion. These entities provide an impenetrable veil around particular transactions.
There is now growing interest on the part of the authorities of some large industrial countries to deal with this problem and the G-7 countries have been paying close attention to
it. The United Nations also has been trying to call attention to
this problem through conferences and reports. In addition, the
OECD has been working intensively on the issue within the
context of its work on unfair tax competition. The Financial
Action Task Force, set up by the G-7 to deal with money laundering activities, has developed a regulatory framework that, if

Electronic Commerce, 6 TAx MGM'T INT'L J. 356 (June 1999).
27. Luca Errico & Alberto Musalem, Off-Shore Banking: An Analysis of Microand Macro-Prudential Issues, IMF Working Paper 99/5 (International Monetary
Fund 1999).
28. UNITED NATIONS, FINANCIAL HAVENS, BANKING SECRECY AND MONEY-LAUNDERING 71 (1998).
29. One reason is that some of this money represents laundered money. Additionally, it is very difficult, under existing rules, for national authorities to identify
the owners of these accounts. Further, many of the off-shore centers have laws
that allow anonymity.
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effectively applied by countries, would reduce the possibility of
money laundering. But the solutions are politically and technically complex. For example, several small Caribbean states reacted strongly to the OECD publication of a list of tax havens.
Further, several countries have objected to the proposal to
abolish bank secrecy laws. Thus, it remains to be seen whether
this problem will continue to grow or if it will be possible to
contain it."0
E. Derivatives and Hedge Funds
The fifth fiscal termite is the growth of new financial instruments and agents for channeling savings, such as derivatives and hedge funds. Many hedge funds operate from offshore centers and are not, or are weakly, regulated. Even those
operating from industrial countries are relatively unregulated.
The funds use new and exotic instruments that raise new
challenges for tax authorities, which often do not have the
skills necessary to deal with them. Furthermore, the same
informational problems mentioned with electronic commerce 3
appear to an even greater extent with the investments of these
hedge funds. In relation to the earnings from derivative instruments, there are huge problems identifying individual beneficiaries, transactions, incomes, and jurisdictions where the
individuals live or where the incomes are generated. The reporting requirements to the tax authorities on the part of the
hedge funds that operate from tax havens are very limited or
non-existent. In many cases, unless or until these incomes are
repatriated and are declared as incomes by those who receive
them, their taxation will remain problematic. The amount of
funds channeled through them is now estimated at around one
trillion dollars." Hedge funds are likely to continue growing
as channels for the investments of wealthy peoples.

30. For a proposal that would aim at curtailing the use of tax havens for
money laundering, see Vrro TANZI, POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE DARK SIDE OF
ECONOMICS, ch. 11 (Edward Elgar ed., 2000). This paper originally was issued as
IMF Working Paper 96/55 (May 1996). Some variants of this proposal are now
receiving serious consideration. from the United Nations and from G-7 countries.
31. See id.
32. See Howard Davies, Creeping Growth of the Hedge Funds, Financial
Times, Aug. 15, 2000, at 19.
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One of the challenges from the growing use of complex
financial instruments, such as derivatives and similar instruments, is that these can be used in tax avoidance schemes by
exploiting uncertainties and inconsistencies in their tax treatment.33 Most tax systems do not capture, sufficiently well, the
special nature of financial derivatives even when the funds
that use them are domestic ones. As an example, the distinction between capital income and capital gains or losses becomes fluid when a contingent claim (gain or loss) can be created on a structure of certain cash flows (income). Likewise, the
separation in tax legislation between dividends and interest
becomes arbitrary since derivatives allow for easy modification
between the external attributes of various financial arrangements. Furthermore, any kinks in tax schedules will lead to
incentives for tax smoothing and the trading of tax positions
around which financial instruments can be designed.
Income from cross-border portfolio investments could be
taxed at the source by withholding taxes. However, with the
widespread use of derivatives, this approach becomes less
appropriate. First, for a derivative that consists of several
contracts, for tax purposes each contract is treated as if standing on its own, leading to incentives to use the most tax efficient combinations of contract components. Second, withholding taxes only apply to positive cash flow, whereas an increasing number of derivatives envisage both positive and negative
cash flows. Furthermore, for tax purposes, in most instances,
cash flows from derivatives are not considered income from
capital in the same sense as dividends and interest. New financial instruments are being created all the time. These new
instruments will challenge the ingenuity of the tax administrators to deal with them. This trend will set the best paid and
best trained minds in the financial markets against the modestly paid employees of the tax administrations.

33. Julian S. Alworth, Taxation and Integrated Financial Markets: The Challenges of Derivatives and Other Financial Innovations, 5 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN.
507 (1998).
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F. Inability to Tax FinancialCapital
The sixth fiscal termite is the growing inability or, often,
unwillingness by countries to tax, especially with high rates,
financial capital and incomes derived by individuals with highly tradable skills. As the international capital market becomes
more integrated and efficient, it becomes more difficult for
countries to impose taxes on mobile capital with rates that are
for above those that can be obtained abroad. Similar considerations apply to the taxation of highly skilled individuals. High
tax rates on financial capital or on highly mobile individuals
provide strong incentives to the taxpayers to move capital
abroad to jurisdictions that tax it lightly or to take residence in
low tax countries. Furthermore, as 'capital markets have become more efficient and more international, the transaction
costs of investing abroad are now much lower. Therefore, even
small differentials in rates of return may be exploited by some
individuals even when many may continue to prefer to invest
in the home market. Similar considerations apply to a growing
number of very able individuals with skills that are marketable internationally.34
The taxation of incomes from financial capital has become
a major and so far unsolved issue within the European Union
and has been forcing countries either to lower marginal tax
rates on incomes or to introduce dual income taxes. Global
income taxes with high marginal tax rates are no longer feasible in a globalizing world. The fact that the marginal tax rates
on the incomes of individuals have been falling in recent years
in most countries is in part a recognition of the impact of globalization.
G. Growing ForeignActivities
The seventh fiscal termite is the increased activities conducted outside of their countries of residence on the part of
some highly skilled individuals. In a world where exchange of

34. The low proportion of individuals who migrate is a misleading indication
of the magnitude of the problem if those who move out are the most productive
individuals. See TANZI 1995, supra note 1. It also should be recalled that tax collection is generally highly concentrated among the individuals with the highest
incomes. Therefore, the loss in revenue may not be reflected by the proportion of

individuals who migrate.
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information among tax authorities is limited and is likely to
remain limited, foreign activity allows individuals to underreport, or not to report at all, their foreign earnings to their
national authorities. At the same time, more and more individuals now invest their savings abroad in ways that allow them
to avoid paying taxes. For example, tax free non-resident accounts provided by many countries are a common vehicle.
The investing of savings abroad has been a major concern
on the part of the European Commission which has advocated
the use of minimum taxes on incomes from financial assets.
However, this proposal has been opposed strongly by some
European countries. The alternative of total exchange of information does not seem a realistic alternative in the foreseeable
future.35
H. Foreign Shopping
The last fiscal termite is the increased travel by individuals which allows them to shop, especially for expensive but low
weight items, in places where sales taxes are low. This development has created incentives, especially for small countries,
to reduce excises and other sales taxes especially on luxury
products in order to attract foreign buyers. 8 This form of tax
exporting and of tax competition is progressively reducing the
degrees of freedom that countries have in imposing excise
taxes on high-priced but easy to transport products. In fact, as
reported above, revenue from excise taxes, especially if gasoline and tobacco products are excluded, has been falling rapidly
over the years."1 As the cost of travel (in time and money)
falls, and as more individuals travel abroad, it will become
increasingly difficult for countries to keep high taxes on luxury
products. Even cigarettes and alcoholic beverages are inducing
some individuals to cross frontiers in order to buy them in
neighboring countries where taxes are lower.

35. In the view of the author of this paper, the EU Summit in Portugal on
June 20th in connection with the Savings Directives, was much too optimistic
regarding the role of exchange of information. See id. at 84-89.
36. Some airports such as those in Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok, and others have become huge shopping centers. Some countries have themselves become
obligatory stopovers for traveling individuals.
37. See OECD, Revenue Statistics, 1965/98 (1999).

1276

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXV:4

III. CAN FISCAL TERMITES BE EXTERMINATED?

The above section has provided examples of the brave new
world we are entering and of the lurking fiscal termites which
are likely to reduce tax collections in future years. The weight
of the developing evidence indicates that without changes to
neutralize the fiscal termites, it is likely that in future years
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP will fall in many OECD and,
perhaps, even in some developing countries.' Of course, how
large this fall will be depends on how fast the termites do their
work. At this point, quantification of these effects is not possible and different individuals may come to different conclusions
about the future quantitative impact of these trends. Leaving
aside the normative question of whether the decline in taxation that might result from globalization is or is not desirable,
a question that has received some attention especially in more
academic work, and by individuals with a public choice bent, it
may be possible for the world community to develop ways of
mitigating, if not totally neutralizing, the impact of some of
these fiscal termites or of introducing new taxes to counter any
potential revenue losses.
While tax experts have often recommended the taxation of
global income, and while in recent decades countries have tried
to implement it, a fundamental change may be to shift from
the global income taxation approach advocated by Henry
Simons38 and his followers toward an explicitly schedular approach that would lower the tax rates on mobile income tax
bases. Schedular taxes had been popular in the French-Italian
tradition of the early 20th Century while the push for global
income taxation had come predominantly from Anglo-Saxon
experts.39 The move to schedular taxes would raise questions
about the fairness of the tax system but would allow countries
to minimize the potential revenue losses from capital flight
and from emigration by lowering tax rates on the more mobile
tax bases." There has been a tendency in this direction in

38. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME

AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY (University of Chicago Press 1938).
39. See id. See also RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, (Rev. ed.,

Brookings Instit. 1976).
40. This is the same principle underlying the assertions of Michael Keen, who
argues that preferential tax regimes may serve a strategic purpose in enabling
countries to confine their most aggressive tax competition to particular aspects of
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recent years. Some of the Nordic countries of Europe and Italy
have introduced systems of dual income taxation combining
progressive taxation of (immobile) labor income and transfer
incomes with a proportional tax on (mobile) income from financial capital.4 However, this change will counter only partly
the downward pressure on tax collections, and is likely to be
combined with pressure for further reductions in the marginal
tax rates.
Governments might develop ways to monitor electronic
commerce and electronic money or they may introduce new
taxes such as "bit taxes," "Tobin taxes," or the like. While the
political mood, especially in the United States, seems against
imposing new taxes on the Internet, at least in the short term,
progress might be made in clarifying how e-commerce transactions can be taxed within the existing tax framework.
The implications of electronic commerce for revenues are
still unknown, however. Some experts feel that the existing tax
system, with certain modifications, could accommodate a larger
presence of e-commerce.4 2 The overriding principle should be
to maintain neutrality in the treatment of e-commerce relative
to other economic activities. This would imply that existing
permanent establishment rules, requiring sufficient physical
presence, also would apply to e-commerce so that the mere
location of a server or a Web site would not give rise to a permanent establishment and a tax liability. Rather, the determining criterion would be where value and wealth were created by capital, equipment, and human activity. This, however,
may not be an easy matter. It also may be feasible to classify
most e-commerce transactions by the same principles as conventional transactions, as involving a good when a customer
acquires something from a provider, even if this is ordered
through the Internet or comes in an electronic format. It is

the tax system. Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition
Less Harmful (Mimeo: 1999) (on file with author). Furthermore, it must be recognized that an expenditure tax now advocated by various tax experts and some
politicians is an extreme form of a schedular approach to income taxation because
it taxes savings at zero rate.
41. Peter Birch Sorensen, From the Global Income Tax to the Dual Income
Tax: Recent Tax Reforms in the Nordic Countries, 1 INTL TAX & PUB. FIN. 1, 5779 (1994).
42. See Boyle, supra note 26.
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open to question whether these optimistic views reflect the
new, and yet evolving reality.
While the international consensus advocates the use of
arm's-length principles in determining the tax liability of multinationals, it has been criticized both for its added administrative complexities, often involving inter-country negotiations
between sovereign tax administrations, but also for disregarding that related entities may be economically different from
unrelated ones. 3 Currency and credit risks, for example, affect related and unrelated parties quite differently, even
though applying arm's-length standards to transactions will
require the hypothetical sharing of cost and risk that might
bear very little resemblance to economic realities.
To overcome these difficulties, it has been suggested to
replace the arm's length principle by formula apportionment of
profits." This is a way to allocate the consolidated income of
multinational businesses across tax jurisdictions, rather than
maintaining focus on individual transactions. The main challenge remains to devise a list of objective and easily measurable criteria that could be used to allocate, in an equitable
manner, taxable income across tax jurisdictions. Possible criteria could include the share of physical assets or perhaps intangible assets (though this would lead to valuation problems), or
share of employment. The share of sales is perhaps a less attractive criterion, essentially taking us back to the problems of
non-arm's-length transactions. With flexible exchange rates,
various accounting difficulties would have to be met.45
Another advantage from the formula apportionment approach, in addition to removing the incentives for multi-nationals to engage in transfer pricing for tax purposes, is that double taxation no longer will be possible if this approach is consistently implemented. Therefore, foreign tax credits will become unnecessary. This substantially could simplify international tax administration. The proposal, though, has its own
difficulties, particularly as regards the definition of the "enter43. Brian E. Lebowitz, Transfer Pricing and the End of International Taxation,
19 TAx NoTEs INTL 1207 (Sept. 27, 1999).
44. See TANZI 1995 and Tanzi 1996, supra note 1. See also Jack M. Mintz,
The Role of Allocation in a Globalized Corporate Income Tax, IMF Working Paper,
WP/98/134 (International Monetary Fund 1998).
45. Income is allocated by formula among the U.S. states and among the
Canadian provinces.
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prise" on which basis the consolidation of income would be
done, as well as the need to develop an international consensus
on tax accounting standards and methods to determine the
taxable income to be shared. Of course, it also would require
the development of an international consensus in favor of this
approach, and a mechanism for its implementation, which
might in itself prove an insurmountable task.
It is possible that off-shore financial centers and tax havens would be driven out of existence by strong, punitive actions on the part of the industrial countries. The OECD has
been preparing guidelines for identifying tax havens, particularly highlighting the lack of effective exchange of information
with other tax authorities and the lack of transparency.6 One
recommendation arising from this work has been the publication of a list of tax havens as a first step toward stemming
money laundering and tax evasion. The identified tax havens
are being encouraged to remove aspects of their fiscal regimes
that are perceived as contributing to harmful tax competition.
However, as expected, these steps have been received with suspicion and apprehension on the part of many smaller states
and some larger states as well. The concept of harmful competition itself has been subject to questions.
Countries might agree to an unlimited exchange of information on taxpayers facilitated by computer technology.47
Most bilateral tax treaties include provisions for the exchange
of information between tax authorities, many modeled after
UN and OECD model tax conventions. These are useful in
providing information to assess multi-nationals or other specific foreign direct investors, since in these cases the taxpayer is
usually well-known. However, the sheer volume of required
data exchange and the use of different languages can make
this an overwhelming and frustrating exercise when the exchange of information extends beyond a small number.
It is a different matter with portfolio investors. Here, the
number of investors is often large and their identities are typi-

46. OECD, HARFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
47. However, legal restrictions, technical difficulties, and national interests are
likely. to prevent this from happening any time soon. See TANZI 1995 and Tanzi
1996, supra note 1. See also Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Taxation in a Borderless
World: The Role of Information Exchange, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN TAXATION
(Bertil Wiman ed., 1999).
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cally unknown to the tax authorities, a problem that has been
exacerbated by innovations in information technology and the
global trading of financial investments.4 1 The exchange of
information, even if conducted on a systematic and sustained
49
basis, is often incapable of capturing these taxable flows.
More recently, though, some OECD members have pledged to
impose a ban on anonymous bank accounts and have restated
the need to give tax authorities access to bank information and
pass this on to foreign tax administrations when requested."°
So, perhaps, efforts to enhance information exchange will get
new impetus in the coming years. Still, it would be unrealistic
to assume that the substantial technical, legal, linguistic, administrative, and political limitations that presently inhibit the
exchange of information can be overcome.
Hedge funds might be subjected to closer scrutiny and
stronger regulations. The impact of these has been the object of
international discussions in the Financial Stability Forum
(among other fora) with a view to reforming the international
financial architecture. However, so far there has been little
explicit focus on the taxation implications in these deliberations. Little action has accompanied the statements that more
needs to be done.
The difficulties with applying, in a comprehensive manner,
a source-based, gross withholding tax to many financialderivatives has led to some calls for a more comprehensive treatment
of income tax applying a residence-based system on cross-border financial transactions.5 ' This could be achieved through
an ad hoc calculation of income where each component of a
derivative is defined and treated separately before the overall
tax liability is aggregated. Another approach would be to use
accruals taxation by "marking to market" financial positions or
by adjusting realized gains for past accruals. The former is
administratively complex, particularly for individuals and
small businesses, as well as if assets are traded only infrequently in thin markets, and may result in liquidity problems.
Moreover, a shift towards the residence principle only can be

48. More than a trillion dollars of value is exchanged every day. Just think of
the difficulty in identifying each transaction.
49. See Tanzi & Zee, supra note 47.
50. However, some countries are opposing this change.
51. See Alworth, supra note 33.
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enforced through an increased exchange of information across
borders, which takes us back to the same informational problems as discussed just above.52
As already has been touched upon, there also are a number of multilateralinitiatives being undertaken to counter the
possible negative impact on tax collections from globalization.
The OECD has prepared guidelines on how to address harmful
tax competition both at the national and international level."
The EU is also discussing the impact of tax competition, including the formulation of a code of conduct for business taxation to help reduce distortions within the EU, to prevent excessive losses of tax revenue and to develop tax structures with
less adverse impact on employment. Governments may one day
even create an International Revenue System that could be
charged with collecting some taxes,' or a World Tax Organization which would help in discussing problems and in developing and coordinating solutions. 5 But these are distant and,
perhaps, utopian possibilities.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Section II addressed various fiscal termites and the way in
which they individually could affect the revenue from various
taxes. It did not address the possibility that some of these
termites will interact to create situations that have been not
even contemplated. 5 But the possibility for this interaction is
clearly present, and the imagination and incentives of the
millions of taxpayers will make sure that these interactions
are discovered, developed, and used. Furthermore, new termites are likely to appear and create additional tax-avoiding
possibilities.
It is unlikely that all the actions described in Section III
will be taken or that, if taken, they will succeed in neutralizing
all the fiscal termites and in protecting the tax systems. Thus,

52. Id.
53. See OECD, supra note 46.
54. Vito Tanzi, Forces that Shape Tax Policy, in TAX POLICY IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 266 (Herbert Stein ed. 1988).
55. Vito Tanzi, Does the World Need a World Tax Organization?in THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 173 (Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka eds., 1999).

56. See, e.g., Krister Andersson, The Ongoing Tax Competition in the EU to
Attract Capital (Mimeo: May 8, 2000) (on file with author).
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the conclusion must be that it would be prudent for many
countries, and especially for those with high tax burdens, to
begin preparing themselves for what could prove to be significant downward pressures on tax levels in future years. This
should be accompanied by new thinking as to how the impact
of globalization and new technology could be turned around to
facilitate a constructive change in the way, and on what, taxes
are being imposed.
While it is uncertain exactly how, and to what extent,
globalization will affect tax collections, it is clear that tax administrators and policy makers will face a challenge in the
coming years that might change the way in which taxes have
hitherto been levied and collected. Responding to this challenge
in a successful manner will require policy makers to mobilize
so-far hidden imaginative reserves. It will require relying more
on taxes that will be little affected by the problems described
above-such as taxes on immobile factors or resources-and by
developing new tax technologies. What should not be done is to
assume that somehow the problem will go away. It seems reasonable to assume that the tax systems of the future will have
different structures and probably lower levels than those of
today.
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Table 1. Tax Trends in OECD Countries, 1965-97
(Percent of GDP and Percent of Total Tax Revenue)

1985

1995

1997

35

37

37

(In percent of total tax revenue)
30
30
26
8
9
8
22
22
18
1
1
1
6
5
8
13
16
12
18
16
24
2
2
2

27
8
25
1
5
18
13
3

27
8
25
1
5
18
13
3

100

100

100

1965
Total tax revenue
Personal income tax
Corporate income tax
Social security contributions
Payroll taxes
Property taxes
General consumption taxes
Specific consumption taxes
Othertaxes
Total

1975

(In percent of GDP)
31
26

100

100
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Table 2. State/Local Incremental Revenue Loss from E-CommerceD2003
($1.000)

US States

Revenue Loss

Percentage of
Total Taxes

US States

Revenue
Loss

Percentage of
Total Taxes

CT
DE
ME
MD
MA
NH
NJ
NY
PA
RI
VT
DC
NE

154,697
n.a.
42,147
157,983
163,074
n.a.
274,274
849,308
358,158
29,811
17,066
29,579
2,076,097

1.34
n.a.
1.49
1.29
0.90
n.a.
1.29
1.62
1.39
1.29
1.38
0.81
1.37

AL
AR
FL
GA
KY
LA
MS
NC
SC
TN
VA
WV
SE

144,845
101,287
753,577
333,376
128,152
243,804
110,683
238,979
124,267
293,032
195,371
56,222
2,723,595

2.88
2.74
2.60
2.53
1.41
4.36
2.08
1.90
1.72
3.77
1.57
1.50
2.38

AK
AZ
CA
CO
HI
ID
MT
NV
NM
OR
TX
UT
WA
WY
West
US

n.a.
183,391
1,493,238
156,161
85,169
36,017
n.a.
102,665
102,626
n.a.
932,350
84,983
347,090
20,670
3,544,360
10,801,039

n.a.
2.36
2.08
2.46
1.79
1.40
n.a.
2.62
3.55
n.a.
3.16
2.52
2.79
2.54
2.42
1.94

IL
IN
IA
KS
MI
MN
MO
NE
ND
OH
OK
SD
WI
MW

453,747
174,347
87,392
101,806
406,833
219,482
212,128
56,718
20,727
360,618
160,237
31,006
171,946
2,456,987

1.91
1.47
1.53
2.05
1.55
1.54
1.48
1.83
1.79
1.71
3.66
3.10
1.33
1.70

Source: William Fox and Donald Bruce, "E-Commerce in the Context of declining state Sales Tax
Bases," Forthcoming in NationalTax Journal.The Table is reported in Tax AdministrationNews,
March, 2000.

